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Since the start of the Bush administration, the U.S.
has sought to advance a strategy called competitive
liberalisation.And, in fact, the U.S. is trying to pro-
mote free trade on multiple fronts: globally
through the WTO,regionally primarily through the
Free Trade Area of the Americas which involves
34 countries of the western hemisphere, and then
bilaterally through agreements with individual
countries in other regions.
By moving on multiple fronts the U.S. hopes to
accomplish a number of objectives. First, since the
U.S.produces about 25 percent of the world’s GDP,
depending on exchange rates, the Administration
believes that in this way it can add to US leverage
for openness. In effect, the U.S. wants to be aggres-
sive on opening markets in a number of areas and
if one party or another decides not to move or to
slow down, we say we are ready to go when you
are, but if you are not ready to go, we shall go with
others who are ready.This is important,in my view,
in part also for the domestic audience, in that we
want to keep free trade on the front burner.
Free trade may be described by the bicycle-theory:if
you don´t keep it moving forward, just like a bicycle,
the gravitational pull will topple it. So we want to
keep moving forward. It is obviously a way to help
businesses, exporters, importers, consumers and the
workers that have their jobs because of trade.We can
also use these agreements to try to break new
ground and set higher standards.For example,in two
free trade agreements we completed with Singapore
and Chile, we have been able to advance the state of
the art in topics like digital intellectual property
rights or some of the services topics.We are even try-
ing to have a co-operative arrangement on environ-
mental labour objectives.And we can also use these
mechanisms to create stronger partnerships with the
WTO because the countries that we work with
become good coalition partners in advancing free
trade in other contexts. So far we feel we have been
able to make progress both generally and specifical-
ly. Generally we have been able to regain momen-
tum for trade in the U.S. and also globally and in
doing so, we have tried to take the sometimes tech-
nical subject of trade and connect it to other objec-
tives – to growth, to development, and also impor-
tantly, after September 11, to a larger security agen-
da. And let me be very clear on this: I certainly
would not suggest that terrorism is caused by pover-
ty. If you look at the demographic backgrounds of
the terrorists, you would have a hard time making
that case, and indeed it would be an insult to hun-
dreds of millions of poor people around the world
who don´t take out their difficulties on blowing up
buildings. But there is no doubt that – as you look
around the world to a place like Indonesia – one
recognises that societies that fragment, that become
less cohesive, where people lose their sense of hope
and opportunity, become fertile grounds for people
who have agendas of destroying as opposed to creat-
ing. In this context trade and openness and democ-
racy can become part of the larger campaign against
terrorism.
US bilateral efforts
President Bush put in a lot of political capital trying
to regain our overall trade negotiating authority that
we call “trade promotion authority”, and that some
of you might have known as “fast track”.There were
three failed efforts in the 1990s to extend this
authority. It took a major effort to move forward,
and many people may be unaware of the fact that
the Trade Act of 2002 which did that also included
about $20 billion of preferential trade for the devel-
oping world analogous to what Europe had done
with the „Everything but arms“ initiative.
Working closely with EU Commissioner Lamy we
were able to launch the WTO negotiations in Doha
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reversing the failure of Seattle. Here I want to give
particular credit to Commissioner Lamy, because
when I took office in 2001, most of my trade minis-
ter colleagues suggested we should not even try
because the cost of failure would be too high for
the WTO. Pascal Lamy was one of the people most
committed to the idea that we should make an
effort and together we worked very hard to
accomplish this.
We also brought China and Taiwan into the WTO,
something that I think will have great historical
importance. Some of the developments in China,
although they move with fits and starts, have been
very important to the international economy. We
now move the Free Trade Area of the Americas
negotiations forward.We completed the Singapore
and Chile free trade agreements and we have
launched a series of new free trade agreements.
One is with the Central America Free Trade
Agreement which includes the five countries of
Central America,another with the five countries of
the Southern African Customs Union, and one
with Morocco, which would be our second agree-
ment with an Arab-Muslim country. We launched
one with Australia and also an initiative called the
Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative, which is to build
on the Singapore Free Trade Agreement, and we
are considering the possibility of additional free
trade agreements with other ASEAN countries.
US global initiatives
Today I want to focus primarily on our global ini-
tiatives in the WTO. As I mentioned, we launched
the Doha Development Agenda in Qatar in
November 2001.EU-US leadership was fundamen-
tal to moving this forward. We now have 146 par-
ticipants – Macedonia joined us recently – and the
primary focus now is on what we have to accom-
plish to have a successful meeting of ministers in
Cancun in September of this year,because we have
a target date of completion of January 2005.This of
course is ambitious, for if you remember, the
Uruguay-Round was begun in 1986 and was not
completed until 1994.We have a much tighter time-
frame, but I do believe it is possible to accomplish
this.
We believe the Doha Agenda is a once-in-a-gener-
ation opportunity to really move the global trading
system forward.It takes a number of years to nego-
tiate these agreements and then of course the
implementation phase covers another ten to fifteen
years. After we launched this agenda, the United
States set forth some very bold proposals in the
industrial and consumer good sectors and the agri-
cultural sector, and we are also very committed to
services.
There are three pillars of what the trade officials
call the market access agenda. First, in agriculture
we have three key elements. One is to eliminate
export subsidies, which the IMF and others have
identified as the most egregious form of interfer-
ence in world agricultural trade and which is also
clearly something that has a very deleterious effect
on developing countries. The proposal is to cut
average world farm tariffs from 60 to 15 percent
according to a formula that would do this. In the
case of the United States, it would cut our average
agricultural tariff from 12 percent to 5 percent and
the formula would have a cap that would limit the
highest tariff in agriculture to 25 percent.
When you consider that, for example, in Japan the
rice tariff ranges between 500 and 1000 percent, or
that our sugar tariffs are about at 100 percent, this
would have a very significant effect in the area
called trade distorting domestic supports. These
are not export subsidies but they are subsidies
internal to a country that distort production and
thereby affect markets. We had a proposal that
would cut $100 billion out of that, cut our support
in half and also bring down the European subsidies
much closer to ours.
Secondly, in the consumer and industrial goods
area we were even bolder because this is the area
that was first protected under the GAP in 1947 and
we argued that after some 50 years it was time to
finally eliminate the tariffs in the industrial sector.
On the way to do that we recommended that all
tariffs at 5 percent or below would be eliminated
within the first five years which would be of bene-
fit to both developed and developing countries.
When we examined the benefit of this measure on
trade between the European Union, the United
States and Japan,we discovered that it would cover
about three quarters of the trade in industrial and
consumer goods. For many of the businesses in the
United States, and I believe this is true in Europe
as well, many of these tariffs are almost at a nui-
sance level.They require paper work, they require
time and effort and so we wanted to clear them outsince many developing countries’ tariffs are not
quite so low.We also thought that this would show
a commitment by the developed countries to open-
ing our markets to the developing world.
And then we also would cut, by the end of the first
five years, tariffs down to 8 percent on their way to
zero. We also proposed a series of what trade offi-
cials call sectoral zero-for-zero initiatives. This
means that if a critical mass of countries were to
agree to eliminate their tariff in a given sector, just
as countries did in the information and technology
area in the 1990s, we would eliminate our tariffs in
that sector, hence it’s zero tariff for zero tariff, and
we would like to try to do this for products of both
developed and developing countries. I will come
back to explain where I think this could be partic-
ularly important for German and European busi-
nesses.
The third proposal addresses the services area
which was not covered by trade negotiations until
the Uruguay Round but has some extremely
important elements. For economic development it
is very hard for countries to really get off the
ground if they don’t have the infrastructure,
telecommunications, financial services, construc-
tion and engineering services. Another fact that
many people are unaware of is that services now
account for the major part of both developing and
developed countries’ GDP. In the United States
services are about 66 percent of our GDP and
about 80 percent of our jobs. The numbers I saw
most recently for Germany were a little over
60 percent and the World Bank’s numbers for
developing countries were about 54 percent.This is
obviously an area where there is a huge potential
for expanding markets.
World Bank studies have shown that global free
trade in industrial goods and agriculture could
boost developing countries’ annual incomes by
$540 billion, lifting some 300 million people out of
poverty, i.e. more than the population of the
United States. Nearly two thirds of these benefits
would go to the developing world not only because
their ability to export to the developed world but
also because of the existing barriers among each
other. About 70 percent of the tariffs that the
developing counties pay are to other developing
countries. So this is a tremendous possibility of
expanding developing countries’ trade. In the ser-
vices area where less work has been done, the
World Bank has shown that you could actually get
a $900 billion annual income boost from removing
the barriers.
European interests
Now let me move more particularly to the Euro-
pean benefits. Some of the statistics I am pointing
to here come from work done at the University of
Michigan. The statistics refer to a combination of
the EU and the EFTA countries. Free trade in
goods would boost the economy of Europe by
some $200 billion a year and in services by some
$300 billion a year.
Just taking up the second point, the German
Economics Ministry pointed to some analysis from
1999 that showed that by cutting industrial tariffs
by just 50 percent as opposed to total elimination
you could create some 55,000 jobs in Germany and
boost Germany’s GDP by r11.5 billion a year.
I mentioned earlier the possibility of zero-for-zero
negotiations. Some of the areas that we are trying
to focus on right now with the European
Commission are aircraft, pharmaceuticals, comput-
ers, medical equipment, electrical equipment,
office and industrial machinery and also autos and
auto parts. Our numbers show that this would
make about a third, maybe a little bit more, of
Germany’s exports tariff-free. The effect of these
numbers may be seen in reference to autos. India’s
auto tariffs are about 105 percent, the EU’s about
10 percent and ours about 2.5 percent.
To be successful in this effort – and this is one of the
items we are working on – we will clearly have to
give different phasing and special differential treat-
ment to the developing world. Nevertheless, as I
mentioned, it also will benefit developing world
trade, because we do not want to repeat a type of
neo-colonialism, where trade just flows form the
developing to the developed countries. There is
tremendous potential for trade among the develop-
ing countries themselves, and we were pleased that
when we came out with our goods proposal UNICE
(Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations
of Europe) was very supportive as was the BDI
(German Federation of Industry).
So where are we today? Earlier this week I attend-
ed a meeting of the OECD countries in Paris. A
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number of developing countries were invited there
as well. Preparing for this meeting over the past
few weeks I have been working closely with EU
Commissioner Pascal Lamy to try to see if we
could get some renewed momentum going at
Cancun. We both felt that, for all the good work
being done by our ambassadors to the WTO in
Geneva, it is vital to draw ministers into this
process. But if you try to get ministers from some
146 countries you must get very focused on the
agenda. So we came up with a list of about six
items – it could vary, it is not trying to leave any-
thing in or out. And these were six categories,
including goods, agriculture, services, and develop-
ment issues, the so-called Singapore issues, like
trade facilitation, transparency in government pro-
curement, topics the European Union has also
been promoting. I think these have good support,
whereas some dealing with investment and compe-
tition policy are going to be little tougher.
But we also were quite specific in coming forward
with four specific ideas to draw closer in the goods
area. And let me tell you the logic here. We knew
that the agricultural discussions were stuck. The
goods discussions are very important for the world
economy as part of the market access agenda, and
the US and the European positions were not all
that different, although ours were a little bit more
aggressive. So we identified four key points of
agreement to a) show that the United States and
the European Commission are working together,
b) add a sense of hope and opportunity for the
other countries, a sense of movement, and c) try to
shape the agenda going on in Geneva,because dur-
ing the month of May the chairman of this negoti-
ating group will be developing a framework.
First, we came together on the idea of having one
harmonising formula to reduce tariffs along the lines
that we suggested.We did not come to an agreement
about the exact cap or method. Second, besides the
idea that we should have a formula, there is the idea
that we should eliminate tariffs below a certain level
– we have not yet agreed on a number, we are at 5
percent, the EU is more around 2 percent, but they
may be able to come up a little bit. Third is the
notion of sectoral zero-for-zero negotiations that I
mentioned,and then,fourth,a component for special
and differential treatment.
This can set the stage but what was also very clear
coming out of the OECD meeting in Paris, is that
there will have to be movement on agriculture.
And this is not just a demand of the United States.
Brazil was very adamant on this, Egypt was very
adamant on it, Indonesia from Southeast Asia was
very strong about this, Morocco, speaking on
behalf of the African group, and of course
Australia,New Zealand and Canada.It is fortunate
that there is a process going on now to consider
reforms of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP).To their credit,Commissioners Fischler and
Lamy have put forward a proposal on behalf of the
Commission. That does not solve everybody’s
problems, but it would have two benefits: it is obvi-
ously driven by European concepts for internal
reform and it also has the possibility of giving the
Commission additional flexibility in these negotia-
tions. Commissioner Fischler is pushing for a deci-
sion on this by June.
One of the reasons why I was in Berlin and in
Paris,where I had discussions with the finance min-
isters and also with members of the business com-
munity, was to emphasise the importance of this
development. I have been trying to set the stage by
showing that for the European business communi-
ty and others there are benefits from the good’s
area and by showing other countries in the world
that the United States and the EU are moving
together. But the ultimate reality is that it will
come down very significantly to the reform of the
Common Agricultural Policy.
Let me just mention what I could consider to be
some of the German interests in the reform of the
CAP. First, this has been driven first and foremost
by the recognition of many European countries of
the need to reform the Common Agricultural
Policy for European reasons. Obviously the
European Union is in the process of enlargement.
Therefore the question is: how easy will it be to
restructure the CAP when you have 25 as opposed
to 15 countries, especially when many of the ten
new members have agricultural sectors with their
own sensitivities.
But in addition, particularly from a German per-
spective, there is a desire to try to focus agricultur-
al policy and consider world concerns, environ-
mental concerns.
The nature of the CAP reform that Franz Fischler
has put together is designed to do this by so-called
de-coupled payments. Without getting too techni-cal, the agricultural area is a little different than
the goods area.The rules permit subsidies but they
have to be de-linked from production, hence the
word de-coupling, and if they are they are put in a
category called the green box, meaning they are
permitted subsidies.
Thus, some of the proposals that Fischler has put
forward, and that the United States started to put
forward in 1996, say that if you want to pursue
world or environmental objectives, you can pay
your farmers. It is up to you or for us to decide
whether that is a good use of money or not, but if
you want to do it, you can do it, just don’t distort
production by encouraging farmers to produce
more than they otherwise would. Because if you
increase prices and as a result get a surplus of pro-
duction, then you want export subsidies in order
that people buy it.
Thus there are reasons why this is being driven by
the EU’s internal interest. But there is a second
benefit which is that CAP reform would give a very
important shot in the arm to these trade negotia-
tions.And again, it does not do as much in the area
of market access, but frankly I think it would be a
very important step.
Additional benefits are that this is one of the best
ways that Europe and the rest of us can help devel-
oping countries. And I know there is a sincere
interest in that, particularly in Germany, and also
in other quarters in Europe,because many of these
developing countries really depend on their agri-
cultural exports to increase their income. It could
be a boost to the fragile world economy.
It would obviously be a great benefit if the Cancun
meeting were successful and we could build confi-
dence,over time reduce those barriers and reap the
benefits that I mentioned in the goods and services
trade. In my view this comes at a particularly
important time for Germany, given the efforts on
structural reform. It is easier to deal with changes
on the domestic side when you have a growing
international economy and more jobs through
exports. Indeed, whether it be Germany or Latin
America or others, it is easier to undertake struc-
tural reforms if you have overall global growth. It
is a good opportunity also, because the proposals
are not being put forward by Brazil or Australia or
the United States but by the European Commis-
sion. Thus, given German sensitivities about oper-
ating in a European framework, the opportunity
presents itself and is also an opportunity to
strengthen a key multilateral institution, the WTO.
And finally, at a time when people are writing sto-
ries about how the United States and Europe can
find areas of co-operation, here is one that is defi-
nitely in everybody’s economic interest and also
supports a multilateral institution.
Many people have said the United States is not
committed to multilateralism, but it is hard to look
at these proposals and say the U.S. is not. Now the
question is whether Europe is committed to multi-
lateralism.
An appeal to European businessmen
It is vital to get European business engaged with
the Doha agenda. I already pointed out some of
the benefits, but here are some examples. Kodak, a
US company, pays $250 million in tariffs around
the world. To the question of how to reduce that
number our answer was that Kodak would have to
learn about agriculture, because to be able to go at
the overall industrial tariffs we are going to have to
deal with the agricultural issue.
It is increasingly important that companies take
the responsibility to try to build support in their
communities, with their employees, with their
shareholders. There is no shortage of people out
there that either want to sound anti-globalisation
themes or talk about protectionism.This is certain-
ly true in the United States. Industries that are
struggling to keep up, that are afraid of competi-
tion, are extremely well organised in Congress.
However, one of my challenges is trying to get
some of the industries whose business models are
totally based on the assumption of openness to act
on that. For example, in trying to get the trade act
through we could not get the votes of the two
Congresswomen from Silicon Valley.Now someone
has to explain to me how the hi-tech community
can survive without global openness. Its businesses
have to make it clear to their members of Congress
how important this issue is.
About four weeks ago I was in Los Angeles trying
to help organise an entertainment coalition for
free trade because increasingly, particularly in
these bilateral agreements, we are dealing with
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some fascinating issues of the digital world and
protection.The Motion Picture Association helped
put together this coalition because half the rev-
enues of the entertainment industry depend on
overseas sales. Well, I think there needs to be a
similar effort in Europe.
Let me give you another example. One of the farm
co-operatives in the United States put on their
biweekly payslips the amount of sales they have
overseas so the employees could see the impor-
tance of overseas trade for their own livelihood.
This is not just a government task.There are many
opportunities to build coalitions with US or other
businesses in areas of common interest. We talked
about the services industry and the goods industry.
I mentioned another topic under the Singapore
agenda, trade facilitation.
In so many quarters of the world the added cost of
simply doing business, whether because of ineffi-
cient custom systems or other arrangements, can
overwhelm what one does in the tariff area. To be
more specific, we have been working with Egypt
(with some of our aid money) to help them build
their customs system. Right now it does not matter
what their tariffs are because the customs official
at the border can decide to double the price or
increase it to some arbitrary degree. If you double
the price it certainly wipes out any benefit of a tar-
iff cut because you have just increased the base to
which the tariff applies.
The final point that I want to leave you with is that
this truly is a moment where it is going to be
absolutely vital to have EU member states recog-
nise the broad benefits of CAP reform and the crit-
icality not only for Europe but for the global trade
negotiations. I know that this is not just a German
responsibility. There is strong support from
Scandinavian countries, from Britain. But it will
come down very heavily to what Germany does. I
left the OECD meeting with a slight additional
sense of optimism. We don’t have to solve every-
thing by the Cancun meeting – we just have to
move the agenda forward to the next stage.